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In 1995, the House of Representatives adopted a rule that re-
quires a three-fifths majority of those voting to pass an increase in in-
come tax rates.1  More than two years later, debate continues over a
rule whose constitutionality has been controverted in Congress, in
the courts, and in academia.  Although a majority of the House
passed the three-fifths rule again in 1997,2 several Representatives
challenged its constitutionality in court.3  In the academic debate, the
latest entry is Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress by Jed
Rubenfeld.4  Professor Rubenfeld claims that the three-fifths rule
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1. See H.R. Res. 6, 104th Cong. §106(a) (1995), reprinted in CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S
MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. No. 103-342, at 658
(1995) (Rule XXI(5)(c)).
2. See H.R. Res. 5, 105th Cong. §106(a) (1997) (re-adopting Rule XXI(5)(c) with minor
modifications, but not changing the three-fifths requirement); RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, 105th Cong., Rule XXI(5)(c) (1997), available at <http://lcweb.loc.gov/
global/legislative/hrules/hrulestoc.html>.
3. See Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d 831, 832-33 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  This litigation has been
ongoing since 1995.  See Skaggs v. Carle, 898 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1995).  In the latest round,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit declined to entertain
the claim of unconstitutionality on the merits, holding that the members of Congress who had
brought the suit were unable to demonstrate that they had standing to sue.  See Skaggs, 110
F.3d at 836.
4. Jed Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress, 46 DUKE L.J. 73 (1996).
Professor Rubenfeld’s essay has already attained a practical significance vouchsafed to few
academic efforts. The one judge who reached the merits in Skaggs v. Carle relied in large
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violates the Presentment Clause of the Constitution,5 arguing that
when the Clause refers to legislation that Congress has passed, the
word “passed” means “passed by majority vote.”6
The academic debate began when seventeen law professors, in-
cluding Professor Rubenfeld, published An Open Letter to Con-
gressman Gingrich.7   Like Professor Rubenfeld’s essay, the Open
Letter also maintained that the three-fifths rule was unconstitutional,
but it relied on different arguments than does Professor Rubenfeld.8
We then rebutted the Open Letter in The Constitutionality of Super-
majority Rules: A Defense.9  In his essay, Professor Rubenfeld does
not defend the Open Letter,10 and even acknowledges that some of
measure on Professor Rubenfeld’s arguments to find the three-fifths rule unconstitutional.  See
Skaggs, 110 F.3d at 846 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
5. The relevant section of the Presentment Clause states: “Every Bill which shall have
passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be pre-
sented to the President of the United States . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
6. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 77-85.
7. Bruce Ackerman et al., An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104 YALE L.J. 1539 
(1994).
8. The Open Letter argued that the Constitution’s specific supermajority requirements
indicated that simple majority voting is required for the passage of ordinary legislation.  See id.
at 1541.  The Open Letter also contended that a legislative supermajority rule conflicted with
the intent of the Framers.  See id. at 1540.
9. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Supermajority
Rules: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483 (1995).  We argued that the Rules of Proceedings Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, gives each house of Congress the authority to pass any rules that
relate to its internal operations unless those rules violate some language or principle in the
Constitution, and that the Open Letter had failed to provide any such language or principle.
See id. at 485-86.  The only inference that can be drawn from the supermajority requirements in
the Constitution is that the Constitution itself does not require a supermajority to pass a bill.
See id. at 488.  Similarly, the Framers’ discussions of supermajorities merely demonstrate that
they did not wish to constitutionally require that bills pass with a supermajority.  See id. at 490.
We also demonstrated that the Open Letter mistakenly claimed that a two-thirds ma-
jority was necessary to repeal the supermajority rule.  See id. at 500-07.  In actuality, House
rules permitted a simple majority to waive or repeal any rule.  See id. at 500-03.  We also ar-
gued that, in any event, the Constitution requires that a majority of a house has the authority to
repeal a rule.  See id. at 503-07.
10. Professor Rubenfeld acknowledges that the principal structural and historical argu-
ments employed by the Open Letter are not sufficient to establish its conclusions.  See Ruben-
feld, supra note 4, at 76-77.  Indeed, Professor Rubenfeld attempts to distance himself from the
Open Letter by stating that he was a “signatory” but not an “author” of the letter.  See id. at 73.
It was not obvious to us that a signatory of an essay is less committed to its reasoning than its
author.  If someone intends to be a “signatory” of an essay, we believe that he ought to make
his status explicit and explain how it differs from authorship.
Another professor who signed the Open Letter, but now argues that the three-fifths
rule is unconstitutional on different grounds, is Susan Low Bloch.  See Susan Low Bloch, Con-
gressional Self-Discipline: The Constitutionality of Supermajority Rules, 14 CONST. COM-
MENTARY 1, 1-5 (1997) (paper given at Tenth Annual Lawyers Convention of the Federalist
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our criticisms were well taken.11  Instead, he now asserts that the
word “passed” in the Presentment Clause means “passed by a major-
ity.”  To support this claim, Professor Rubenfeld offers a variety of
hypotheticals intended to show that a majority requirement must be
read into the Clause in order to avoid absurd consequences.12  For in-
stance, he argues that our reading of the Clause would allow the
House to preclude Members from voting while permitting non-
members to vote.13  Professor Rubenfeld also contends that we are
guilty of gross inconsistency in asserting that a house can require a
supermajority to pass legislation but may not insulate legislative rules
from repeal by a majority.14
We write to rebut this new attack on the constitutionality of the
three-fifths rule.  We show that Professor Rubenfeld’s parade of hor-
rible hypotheticals is precluded by other constitutional clauses.  Most
significantly, we argue that the House Composition Clause15 requires
that Members of the House be given the right to vote and precludes
non-members from voting on the passage of legislation.  We also
show that our interpretation of the House Composition Clause would
prevent another series of horrible hypotheticals depriving Members
of their rights as legislators, whereas Professor Rubenfeld’s interpre-
tation of the Presentment Clause would not.  Further, we contend
that there are strong reasons to conclude that the Framers did not use
the term “passed” to mean “passed by majority vote.”
Second, we argue that there is no inconsistency in an interpreta-
tion of the Constitution that would permit Congress to pass super-
majority rules but which would require those rules to be subject to
repeal by a simple majority.  Historical and structural principles re-
quire a majority of the legislature to have the power to repeal rules,
but no such principles preclude a rule that requires supermajority
Society) (arguing that the three-fifths rule unduly enhances the power of the House of Repre-
sentatives); Tenth Annual Lawyers Convention of the Federalist Society (C-SPAN television
broadcast, Nov. 15, 1996) (explicitly stating that she does not rely on the argument that the
three-fifths rule is unconstitutional because it is anti-democratic).  For our debate with Profes-
sor Bloch, see John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, House Rules: Is a Supermajority Re-
quirement for Tax Hikes Constitutional?, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1997, at 78.
11. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 73-74.
12. See id. at 78-85.
13. See id. at 80-84.
14. See id. at 88-89.
15. The House Composition Clause provides: “The House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States.”  U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
MCGINN1 06/04/98  1:32 PM
330 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:325
support for passage of legislation.
We conclude with a discussion of methodological principles.
While Professor Rubenfeld interprets the Constitution through a se-
ries of hypotheticals and appears to eschew inferences from history,
structure, and purpose, we argue that these traditional interpretive
canons are the only legitimate means to interpret the Constitution.
Indeed, these canons are so deeply rooted that Professor Rubenfeld
is forced to rely on them, even though he does so implicitly and selec-
tively.
I. THE PASSAGE OF BILLS
Professor Rubenfeld argues that the term “passed” in the Pre-
sentment Clause16 means “passed by majority vote” and therefore the
Constitution prohibits the House from adopting a different voting
rule.17  He acknowledges that “passed” might also be interpreted to
mean “passed under the rules governing the house.”18  Under that in-
terpretation, the three-fifths rule would be constitutional, because the
Constitution gives each house the power to set its own procedural
rules.19  Professor Rubenfeld argues, however, that if “passed” had
this latter meaning, the House of Representatives could then enact
certain types of legislative rules that clearly should be unconstitu-
tional, but would not be prohibited by either the Presentment Clause
or any other constitutional provision.20
Professor Rubenfeld places three types of legislative rules in this
category.  First, the House of Representatives could enact rules that
would deprive certain Members of the right to vote on whether a bill
should pass.21  Second, the House could enact rules that would grant
the right to vote to persons who are not Members of the House.22  Fi-
16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
17. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 76-85.
18. See id. at 74.
19. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
20. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 79-85.
21. Professor Rubenfeld discusses two hypothetical rules that would deprive Members of
their right to vote on whether a bill should pass.  The “Big-Three Rule” would deprive Repre-
sentatives of California, New York, and Texas from voting on the passage of bills.  The “Big-
Ten Rule” would limit voting on the passage of bills to Representatives from the ten largest
states.  See id. at 79-80.
22. As an example of this type of rule, Professor Rubenfeld discusses the “D.C. Rule,”
which would require bills that affect the District of Columbia to secure the approval of its
Mayor in order to pass the House.  See id. at 82-83.
MCGINN1 06/04/98  1:32 PM
1997] LEGISLATIVE SUPERMAJORITY RULES 331
nally, the House could pass rules that would condition passage of a
bill in the House on actions taken by the Senate.23
According to Professor Rubenfeld, if the Presentment Clause is
interpreted to require majority voting, then each of these types of
rules is unconstitutional.  A majority voting rule permits the passage
of a bill only if it is supported by a majority of the Members of each
house that are present.  Therefore, no Member who is present may be
deprived of his vote and only Members may vote.  By contrast, if the
Presentment Clause permits the House to choose any voting rule,
then Professor Rubenfeld argues that one must either find these rules
to be constitutional or invent a prohibition, deriving it “from the pe-
numbras and emanations of other provisions.”24
In this section, we argue that Professor Rubenfeld is mistaken.
First, we demonstrate that Professor Rubenfeld has not supplied any
reason to interpret the Presentment Clause to mandate majority rule,
because each of the three types of rules violates other constitutional
provisions.  We also show that the constitutional provisions on which
we rely would bar other equally problematic rules that his interpreta-
tion of the Presentment Clause is powerless to preclude.  Finally, we
argue that it is unlikely that the Framers would have used the term
“passed” to mean “passed by majority vote.”  In the legal and linguis-
tic context of the framing, the preferred meaning of the term
“passed” did not imply passage by a majority.
A. The Right to Vote
Although Professor Rubenfeld argues that it is the Presentment
Clause which prohibits the House from either depriving Members of
their right to vote on whether a bill should pass or providing non-
members with this right, these prohibitions are actually imposed by
the House Composition Clause.  The House Composition Clause
provides that the “House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several
states.”25  The Clause establishes two fundamental principles about
the House: the House is composed of Representatives and these Rep-
resentatives are deemed to be Members of the House.
The language in the House Composition Clause describing Rep-
23. The conditional rule discussed by Professor Rubenfeld is the “two-thirds-two-thirds”
rule, which we address below.  See infra Part I.C.
24. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 82.
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
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resentatives as Members of the House does not merely indicate that
Representatives are part of the House.  Rather, the use of the tradi-
tional term “Member” suggests that the Framers were conferring on
Representatives the historic rights of members of a legislative assem-
bly.  The most important of these rights is the exclusive right of
members to vote on whether a bill should pass.  Historically, mem-
bers of Anglo-American legislatures have had this right and non-
members have not.26  When the Framers made Representatives
Members of the House, they were assuming that Representatives
would have the exclusive right to vote on bills.27  This conclusion is
reinforced by the language of the Clause, which states that the
“House of Representatives shall be composed of Members.”  If the
House consists solely of Members, then only Members may vote on
decisions such as whether to pass a bill.28
26. The exclusive right of members to vote on the passage of bills was recognized in Par-
liament during the 18th century and in the first Congress.  The traditional rule in the House of
Commons was that members had both the right and the duty to vote.  See THOMAS JEFFERSON,
A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE (2d ed. 1812) [hereinafter JEFFERSON, PAR-
LIAMENTARY PRACTICE], reprinted in JEFFERSON’S PARLIAMENTARY WRITINGS 353, 407
(Wilbur Samuel Howell ed., 1988); THOMAS JEFFERSON, PARLIAMENTARY POCKET-BOOK,
[hereinafter JEFFERSON, PARLIAMENTARY POCKET-BOOK] reprinted in JEFFERSON’S
PARLIAMENTARY WRITINGS, supra, at 47, 90-91; LUTHER STEARNS CUSHING, ELEMENTS OF
THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
156-59, 692-93, 696-99, 717 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 2d ed. 1856); see also 2 JOHN
HATSELL, PRECEDENTS OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 140 (1786) (noting that
when a division is to be had, “all Members who were in the House, must be told [to vote] on
one side or the other, and cannot be suffered to Withdraw”).  The House of Commons also re-
stricted the right to vote on bills to members.  See CUSHING, supra, at 156, 698-99; see also
HATSELL, supra, at 140 (noting that all strangers had to be removed before the House pro-
ceeded to a division).
The duty of Members to vote was also recognized by the rules adopted by the House
of Representatives in the First Congress.  See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 99 (Joseph Gales ed.,
Gales & Seaton 1834) (stating that every Member in the House is obligated to vote when a
question is put); H.R. DOC. NO. 103-324, at 14 (1994) (same).  These rules also indirectly indi-
cated that only Members may vote.  See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra, at 98-102 (referring
several times to the duty of Members to vote, and making no mention of votes by other per-
sons).  The exclusive right of Members to vote on the passage of bills remains the rule today.
See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 2, Rule VIII(3).
27. Traditional legislative rules did prohibit a member from voting on any question “of
which he is immediately and particularly interested.”  1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 26, at
99; CUSHING, supra note 26, at 692; HATSELL, supra note 26, at 119-22.  This limitation reflects
the ancient principle that no man may be a judge in his own case.  See THE FEDERALIST NO.
10, at 58 (James Madison) (Henry B. Dawson ed., 1891).  It continues to be part of the House
Rules.  See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 2, Rule VIII(1).
28. We also believe that the Constitution forbids the House from conferring one vote on
some Members while providing more than one vote to other Members.  First, traditionally each
member of the legislature had an equal number of votes—one.  See CUSHING, supra note 26, at
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This interpretation of the House Composition Clause derives
support not only from text and history, but also from purpose and
structure.  The Framers would certainly have intended that Members
of the House have the exclusive right to vote on bills.  If the House
could deprive Representatives from certain states of the right to vote
on bills or could assign that right to non-members of its choosing, a
majority of the House could circumvent the carefully crafted struc-
ture established by the Framers to govern national legislation.  This
structure maintained important compromises that were essential to
the Constitution’s creation, such as the equilibrium between large
and small states.  The structure also protected minorities by making it
more difficult for unjust legislation to pass.29  It is inconceivable that
the Framers would have permitted a majority of the House to subvert
this arrangement.30
The structure of the Constitution also supports this interpreta-
tion.  First, constitutional clauses that regulate Members of Congress
confirm that only Members have the right to vote on bills.  Article I,
Section 5 of the Constitution states that “the Yeas and Nays of the
Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one
fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal” of the house.31  This
clause suggests that only Members may vote, because it requires that
only the votes of Members be recorded.  If the Framers believed that
non-members could vote, they no doubt would have required that the
“Yeas and Nays of all persons voting” be recorded.
The Incompatibility Clause, which provides that “no Person
holding any Office under the United States shall be a Member of ei-
ther House during his Continuance in Office,” also suggests that non-
696-99; JEFFERSON, PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE, reprinted in JEFFERSON’S PARLIAMENTARY
WRITINGS, supra note 26, at 407; JEFFERSON, PARLIAMENTARY POCKET-BOOK, reprinted in
JEFFERSON’S PARLIAMENTARY WRITINGS, supra note 26, at 90-91.  Second, equal voting rights
accords with the traditional legislative principle of “the perfect equality of all members of the
House.”  1 JOSEPH REDLICH, THE PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 49 (1907); see id.
at xxxi.  Finally, it would be absurd for the Constitution to protect the equality of Members by
prohibiting the House from depriving a Member of his right to vote, but allowing the House to
circumvent this restriction by conferring more than one vote on other Members.
29. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 27, at 62-64.
30. In contrast, the three-fifths rule cannot fundamentally disturb these compromises be-
cause, under that rule, all Members, and only Members, retain the basic right to vote.  While
the rule may advantage some states on particular issues, the potential for some advantage is
created by all rules.  For instance, providing substantial power to committee chairmen may give
greater leverage to those states with greater average longevity of service among their represen-
tatives.
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
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members may not vote.32  The purpose of the Incompatibility Clause
is to prohibit individuals who are serving in Congress from also
holding executive or judicial offices.33  If the Framers believed that
non-members could be given the right to vote, it is very unlikely that
they would have applied the restrictions in the Clause simply to
Members of Congress.  There is little reason to prohibit Members of
Congress from holding executive or judicial offices, while simultane-
ously allowing non-members who vote to hold those offices.
Second, the principles governing other constitutional offices also
suggest that Members of Congress enjoy the traditional powers pos-
sessed by members of legislatures.  When the Constitution establishes
a traditional office, we often infer that it confers some of the tradi-
tional powers of that office.  For example, the Constitution provides
federal judges with the immunity from damage actions for wrongful
decisions that judges traditionally enjoyed at common law.34  Thus, if
Congress passed a law that sought to eliminate this traditional immu-
nity, it would no doubt be unconstitutional, even though no constitu-
tional provision expressly confers the immunity.  The immunity is
simply one of the attributes of being a judge.
Conversely, when the Constitution establishes an office, we also
often make the inference that no other person may exercise the pow-
ers of that office.  Suppose that Congress passed a law that gave the
Governor of North Carolina the right to vote on the resolution of
Supreme Court cases, but expressly stated that he would be neither a
Justice nor a member of the Court.  Clearly, that law would be un-
constitutional, because it would purport to confer the power of a Su-
preme Court Justice on a person who had not been properly ap-
pointed to the office.35
Curiously, Professor Rubenfeld appears to take the opposite po-
sition in his discussion of the hypothetical rule that would give the
Mayor of the District of Columbia the right to disapprove House bills
affecting the District.  Professor Rubenfeld suggests that the rule
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
33. See Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of
Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1994).
34. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-09 (1978); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 335, 347 (1872).
35. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124-26 (1976) (per curiam) (noting that the determi-
nation of whether a person is an “Officer of the United States” within the meaning of the Ap-
pointments Clause turns on the authority the person exercises, not on the name given to his
position).
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would not violate the House Composition Clause because “[t]he
House would not be saying that the Mayor of the District was a
‘Member’ of the House, merely that his approval of legislation was
necessary” to pass a bill.36  Under this logic, the Governor of North
Carolina could vote on Supreme Court cases, because Congress
would not be saying the Governor was a Justice, merely that he may
vote on cases.
Professor Rubenfeld makes two principal arguments against our
interpretation of the House Composition Clause, but neither is per-
suasive.  First, he argues that the “obvious purpose” of the Clause is
to specify that Representatives have two-year terms and are to be
popularly elected.37  Apparently, Professor Rubenfeld reads the
Clause as if it stated “Representatives shall be chosen every second
year by the people of the several states.”  This interpretation ignores
the first part of the Clause which states that the “House of Represen-
tatives shall be composed of Members.”  There is no warrant to ig-
nore a part of the Clause that stands grammatically and logically on
its own.
Professor Rubenfeld also claims that the language of the Senate
Composition Clause argues against our interpretation of the House
Composition Clause.38  Because the Constitution expressly states that
each Senator has one vote, but not that each Representative has one
vote, Professor Rubenfeld argues that we are committed to the view
that the Constitution does not confer the right to vote on each Rep-
resentative.39  But this argument is flawed, because there were other
compelling reasons for the Framers to have expressly spelled out that
each Senator received only one vote.  The Senate is the branch of the
legislature that represents the states.  Each state has equal represen-
tation in the Senate and Senators were originally chosen by the state
legislatures.40  Indeed, under the Articles of Confederation, which
governed the nation before the Constitution was ratified, each state
had only a single vote, even though the state might have had numer-
ous representatives.41  If the Constitution had not expressly indicated
36. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 82 n.33.
37. Id.
38. The Senate Composition Clause provides that the “Senate of the United States shall
be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years;
and each Senator shall have one Vote.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
39. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 82.
40. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
41. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V (U.S. 1777) (providing each state with one
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that each Senator had one vote, it might plausibly have been con-
cluded that each state would have a single vote in the Senate to be
exercised jointly by its Senators.42  By contrast, representation in the
House of Representatives was based on population, so there was no
need for the Framers to expressly provide that each Member of the
House would have a single vote.
We conclude that the House Composition Clause guarantees to
each Representative the exclusive right to vote on whether a bill
should pass.  Thus, Professor Rubenfeld’s attempt to argue that we
are committed to interpreting the Presentment Clause to require
majority voting fails.  As we now show, it is Professor Rubenfeld who
is committed to our interpretation of the House Composition Clause.
B. Other Rights of Members
Professor Rubenfeld’s main argument relies on the premise that
the Framers would not have permitted the House to pass rules that
either deny Representatives the right to vote on bills or confer that
right on persons other than Representatives.43 What Professor
Rubenfeld does not recognize is that his interpretation of the Pre-
sentment Clause would permit equally troubling rules that our inter-
pretation of the House Composition Clause would prohibit.
Consider a variant of the “Big-Three Rule” that Professor
Rubenfeld discusses.44  Under this variation, which we will call the
Procedural Big-Three Rule, no Member of the House from Califor-
nia, New York, or Texas may vote on whether to pass any rule of
proceeding of the House.  This rule would be devastating to Mem-
bers from these three states, because House rules govern a wide
range of House proceedings, including which bills will actually be
voted on by the House, and the power of committees.45  One who be-
lieves that the Big-Three Rule is unconstitutional should also believe
the Procedural Big-Three Rule is unconstitutional.
vote in Congress, but requiring that each state be represented by at least two, and no more than
seven, delegates).
42. Although the Senate Composition Clause does not say so expressly, other constitu-
tional clauses clearly indicate that Senators are Members of the Senate.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (“Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of
its own Members . . . .”); id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may . . . punish its Members . . . .”).
43. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 81-83.
44. As described above, the Big-Three Rule would prevent Representatives from Califor-
nia, New York, and Texas from voting on the passage of bills.  See supra note 21.
45. See CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 252 (1989).
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Professor Rubenfeld, however, has no way to find this rule un-
constitutional, because it would not violate his interpretation of the
Presentment Clause.  Under his view, the Presentment Clause merely
requires that each house use a simple majority voting rule to deter-
mine whether a bill passes.46  It does not apply to votes on whether to
pass rules.  These decisions are governed by the Rules of Proceedings
Clause, which does not use the term “pass.”47
The Procedural Big-Three Rule, however, is easily found uncon-
stitutional under our interpretation of the House Composition
Clause.  In making Representatives Members of the House, the
Framers provided them with the fundamental rights traditionally en-
joyed by members of legislative assemblies.  While one of these rights
is the exclusive right to vote on the passage of bills, another is the ex-
clusive right to vote on rules of proceedings.48  As with the right to
vote on bills, the Framers certainly would have intended that Mem-
bers have the exclusive right to vote on rules of proceedings to pro-
tect the structure that the Framers designed to govern legislation.
In addition to the rights to vote on bills and rules of proceedings,
we also believe that Representatives possess various other rights that
members of legislatures have traditionally enjoyed, including the ex-
clusive rights to make motions, to introduce bills, and to object to
violations of the rules.49  We doubt that Professor Rubenfeld would
46. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 78.
47. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Pro-
ceedings . . . .”).
48. The traditional right of Members to vote was not limited to voting on the passage of
bills.  Rather, that right extended to all votes in the full House, including votes on rules of pro-
ceedings.  See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 26, at 99-100 (establishing rules for voting
on “any question,” and requiring every member present in the House to vote when “a ques-
tion” is put); CUSHING, supra note 26, at 693 (discussing the “duty of the members of our leg-
islative assemblies to vote in all questions that may arise therein . . . .”); JEFFERSON, PAR-
LIAMENTARY PRACTICE, supra note 26, reprinted in JEFFERSON’S PARLIAMENTARY
WRITINGS, supra note 26, at 404-07 (indicating the wide variety of matters on which the votes
of members of the House of Commons were taken).
49. See CUSHING, supra note 26, at 312-13, 802-04; 1 HATSELL, supra note 26, at 87.  The
traditional rights of members to make motions and to introduce bills were not unlimited; these
rights were subject to limitations designed to further the orderly conduct of legislative business.
See, e.g., CUSHING, supra note 26, at 803 (noting that the introduction of bills in House of
Commons requires leave of the House).  Indeed, there is a strong argument for interpreting
these rights as mainly prohibiting a house from discriminating against certain Members.  This
interpretation would allow the houses wide discretion to establish rules while preserving the
core of the legislative structure established by the Framers.  The interpretation also derives
support from the traditional legislative principles of protecting the minority and “the perfect
equality of all members.”  REDLICH, supra note 28, at 49.
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deny that a rule attempting to deprive a Representative of one these
rights would be unconstitutional.  Yet, none of these rights can be de-
rived from the Presentment Clause.  They flow naturally, however,
from the House Composition Clause.50
C. The Two-Thirds-Two-Thirds Rule
Professor Rubenfeld also argues that our interpretation of the
Presentment Clause would allow the House to pass a rule that he
calls the “two-thirds-two-thirds” rule.51  Under this rule, a bill is
deemed to pass the House if it secures a two-thirds vote of the
House, provided that it also secures a two-thirds vote of the Senate.52
If the bill does not receive a two-thirds vote in the Senate, it is
deemed not to have passed the House, even though it may have actu-
ally received a two-thirds vote in the House.  Once again, Professor
Rubenfeld argues that this rule is unconstitutional and that the only
legitimate way to reach this conclusion is to interpret the Present-
ment Clause to mandate majority voting.53  In his view, the Clause re-
quires “every bill which shall have passed the House and Senate by
majority vote” to be presented to the President.
We also believe that the two-thirds-two thirds rule is unconstitu-
tional, but conclude that its infirmity lies elsewhere.  The rule is un-
50. The rights of territorial delegates appear to constitute an exception to the exclusive
right of Members to exercise various powers.  Historically, delegates from United States terri-
tories have exercised several powers of Members.  These powers have included, at different
times, the right to engage in debate, to serve on committees, and to vote on committees, but
never to vote in the full house.  See Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1994); 2
ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 861-68 (1907).
The House’s refusal to provide voting rights to territorial delegates in the full House
provides additional support for our conclusion that such voting rights are restricted to Mem-
bers, but the conferral of other rights on these delegates does suggest an exception to the prin-
ciple that Members have exclusive rights.  Nonetheless, this exception is a limited one and does
not unravel our interpretation of the House Composition Clause.  The practice of limiting the
rights of delegates has a long history, dating from early Congresses.  See Michel, 14 F.3d at 630-
32; HINDS, supra, at 861-68.  There is also a long history of exceptions to the application of
separation of powers principles to the territories.  See American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1
Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) (holding that territorial courts are not subject to the requirements of Arti-
cle III); Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CAL. L. REV.
853, 877-907 (1990) (discussing inconsistencies between territorial structures and constitutional
mandates).  Thus, the historical and structural arguments that support limited rights for territo-
rial delegates suggest that even these rights may not be exercised by any other person.  See
Michel, 14 F.3d at 630.
51. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 84.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 85.
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constitutional because it permits the House to effectively impose a
two-thirds supermajority rule on the Senate, despite the fact that the
Constitution allows the Senate to establish its own rules.54  The root
of the rule’s unconstitutionality can be exposed by reviewing other
rules that one house may use to burden the operations of another.
Consider rules under which the House of Representatives refuses to
bring to the floor bills passed by the Senate unless the Senate abol-
ishes all its standing committees or moves its meetings out of the
Capitol.  These rules would not violate the Presentment Clause or
any other express constitutional provision, so Professor Rubenfeld
would seem obliged to find them constitutional.  They are problem-
atic, however, because the House is exercising its authority under the
Rules of Proceedings Clause to burden the Senate’s authority to
make its own rules.
The well-established jurisprudence of unconstitutional condi-
tions places limits on the government’s power to provide benefits
only on the condition that an individual relinquish his constitutional
rights.  This jurisprudence has been extended to limit the power of
one part of government to provide benefits to another part only on
the condition that the latter forego exercising its constitutional pow-
ers.55  The doctrine can therefore be applied to the relationship be-
tween the two legislative houses.  Because the Constitution does not
require the House to pass or even to consider bills that are passed by
the Senate, the House provides a benefit to the Senate when it agrees
to consider such bills.  Under the two-thirds-two-thirds rule, the
House provides this benefit to the Senate only on the condition that
the Senate does not exercise its constitutional right to pass bills by a
mere majority vote.
Professor Rubenfeld argues that the conditional character of the
two-thirds-two-thirds rule is not the source of the constitutional
problem.  He correctly observes that each house often adopts joint
rules that are conditioned on its counterpart adopting the same rule.56
54. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (providing that “[e]ach House may determine the
Rules of its Proceedings” (emphasis added)).
55. See 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 258, 261-63 (1989) (concluding that proposed legislation
contained an unconstitutional condition that abridged the President’s constitutional power to
conduct covert actions).  One of us has recently discussed the application of the doctrine of un-
constitutional conditions to government entities and argued that the Line Item Veto Act places
an unconstitutional condition on the President’s power to veto bills.  See Michael B. Rappaport,
Veto Burdens and the Line Item Veto Act, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 771, 778-90 (1997).
56. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 84.
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His argument mistakenly assumes, however, that conditions are ei-
ther all constitutional or all unconstitutional.  It is generally recog-
nized that some conditions are unconstitutionally burdensome while
others are not.57
Distinguishing between constitutional and unconstitutional con-
ditions has often proved to be an extremely difficult task, but in this
case the distinction seems plain enough.  Joint rules are adopted in an
effort to coordinate action between the houses.  Each house agrees to
depart from the rule it would otherwise adopt to reach a set of rules
acceptable to both houses.  While joint rules involve a mutually ac-
ceptable arrangement to promote common purposes, the two-thirds-
two-thirds rule is an attempt by the House to determine the voting
rule of the Senate.58  Thus, the joint rules traditionally passed by the
houses are constitutional; the two-thirds-two-thirds rule is not.59
D. The Meaning of “Passed”
Professor Rubenfeld’s argument proceeds in two steps.  First, he
asserts that the text does not provide any reason to doubt that
“passed” in the Presentment Clause could as easily mean “passed by
majority vote” as “passed under the rules governing the House.”60
Then he argues that structure and purpose support the former
meaning.61  While we have refuted the second step of his argument,
57. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 5 (1993); Seth Kreimer, Allo-
cational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293,
1297-98 (1984); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413,
1415 (1989).
58. Once one recognizes that the two-thirds-two-thirds rule places an unconstitutional
condition on the Senate’s powers, it is possible to imagine various rules that would raise similar
concerns, but would not be addressed by the Presentment Clause.  For example, imagine a
House rule that prevented the House from voting on certain types of bills unless the Senate
confirmed a particular nominee to the Supreme Court, or a Senate rule that required the Sen-
ate to refuse to confirm all nominees unless the House impeached a certain executive officer,
or a Senate rule that required the Senate to refuse to advise on and consent to treaties unless
the House conducted a particular legislative investigation.
59. Although we do not explore the issue, the two-thirds-two-thirds rule may also be un-
constitutional for the same reason that the D.C. Rule is unconstitutional—because it deprives
Members of the House of their exclusive right to vote on bills in the House.  See supra notes 25-
36 and accompanying text.  The two-thirds-two-thirds rule appears to allow Senators to deter-
mine whether a bill passes the House, but Senators are no more Members of the House than is
the Mayor of the District of Columbia.
60. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 74-78.
61. See id. at 78-85.
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we believe that the first step is also mistaken.62
Professor Rubenfeld provides two reasons to support his claim
that “passed” could mean “passed by majority vote.”  First, he argues
that majority rule was the “established practice of the British Parlia-
ment and was regarded as the ‘natural’ rule for all assemblies.”63
Thus, when the Framers used “passed,” everyone would have under-
stood that they meant “passed” according to the prevailing rule.64
Although majority rule did govern the British Parliament, Pro-
fessor Rubenfeld’s argument runs into trouble on this side of the At-
lantic.  Before the Constitution was ratified, the United States was
governed by the Articles of Confederation.  The Articles established
a Congress composed of representatives from each of the states, with
each state having one vote.  Significantly, the Articles imposed a su-
permajority rule on Congress’s exercise of many of its powers.65
The Articles’ use of a supermajority rule argues strongly against
Professor Rubenfeld’s claim that the Framers used “passed” to mean
“passed by majority vote.”  The Framers would have expected the
Constitution to be interpreted against the backdrop of the Articles.
Because the Articles employed a supermajority rule,66 the Framers
would not have simply assumed that everyone would understand that
62. While this section presents arguments why “passed” should not be read to require
majority voting, we do not repeat here the additional arguments supporting this conclusion that
we presented in our earlier article.  See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 9, at 485-500.
63. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 77.
64. See id.
65. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, § 6 (U.S. 1777) (requiring a vote of 9 out
of 13 states to take various actions, including engaging in war, entering into treaties, coining
money, borrowing money, and appropriating money).
66. The Articles were not the only document in the post-Revolutionary War period to
employ supermajority rules.  Even a brief review of the early state constitutions shows that they
departed from the voting rule that mandates a majority of the quorum to pass a bill.  See, e.g.,
DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. VI, § 1 (requiring two-thirds of each house to establish a court); GA.
CONST. of 1798, art. I, § 17 (requiring two-thirds of each house to reintroduce a bill that was
rejected by either house); id., art. I, § 24 (requiring two-thirds of the general assembly to pass a
gratuity for any person); id. art. III, § 9 (requiring two-thirds of each house to pass divorce
acts); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. II, arts. 20, 37 (requiring a supermajority to pass a bill when less
than a specified number of the members of each house are present); N.J. CONST. of 1776, art.
III (requiring a majority of all the representatives, not simply of the quorum, to pass all bills);
N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. VI (requiring two-thirds of each house to eliminate voting by ballot
in general elections); R.I. CONST. of 1841, art. IX, § 8 (requiring assent of two-thirds of each
house to appropriate public money for local purposes, or to create or alter a corporation); VT.
CONST. of 1786, ch. II, § IX (requiring a quorum of two-thirds for consideration of tax-raising
measures).  For a useful compilation of current and historical state constitutions, see generally
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS (William F. Swindler ed.,
1973).
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legislatures always pass bills by majority vote.67  Thus, if the Framers
had intended to mandate majority voting, they would have done so
explicitly.68
The second reason why Professor Rubenfeld believes that
“passed” can mean “passed by majority vote” is that “[d]ictionaries
of older American and English usage define ‘pass’ in just such
terms.”69  Professor Rubenfeld, however, supports this claim with but
a single citation from a dictionary published a hundred years after the
framing of the Constitution.70  By contrast, our research suggests that
the preferred meaning of “passed” did not require a majority vote.
The most important lexicographical source—Samuel Johnson’s dic-
tionary, published in 1786—defines “pass” simply as “[t]o be en-
acted.”71  While there is evidence that “passed” was sometimes used
to imply a majority vote,72 this was apparently a secondary meaning
67. The Articles also support our conclusion in another way.  In addition to requiring
Congress to secure a supermajority to exercise certain powers, the Articles stated that for the
exercise of other powers, nothing could be determined “unless by the votes of a majority of the
United States in Congress assembled.”  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, § 6 (U.S. 1777).
That the drafters of the Articles made this majority voting explicit also casts doubt on Professor
Rubenfeld’s claim that everyone would have understood that “passed” meant “passed by ma-
jority vote.”  The drafters’ inclusion of a specific majority requirement shows that they recog-
nized that other voting rules were possible.
68. Other structural arguments also cast doubt on Professor Rubenfeld’s claim that
“passed” means “passed by majority vote.”  First, consider the Residual Presentment Clause,
which provides that “Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate
and House of Representatives may be necessary” must be presented to the President in the
same way that a bill is required to be presented.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.  The Clause was
inserted to ensure that Congress could not circumvent the presentment requirement by calling
proposed legislation by a name other than “bill.”  See Michael B. Rappaport, The President’s
Veto and the Constitution, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 735, 752 (1993).  Thus, the same rules that govern
the passage of bills should apply under this Clause, yet the Clause does not use the term
“passed.”  Instead, it uses “concurrence,” which is hard to interpret as requiring a majority
vote.  Second, the Presentment Clause itself uses the term “passed” in a manner that cannot
possibly mean “passed by a majority vote.”  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (if “two thirds of
that House shall agree to pass the Bill”); Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 78.  It is unlikely that the
Framers would have used the term “passed” in two different ways in the same clause.
69. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 77.
70. See id. (citing 2 STEWART RAPALJE & ROBERT E. LAWRENCE, A DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN AND ENGLISH LAW 935 § 4 (1888)).
71. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 8G (London 1786).
A later American edition of Johnson’s dictionary also does not define “pass” as enacted by
majority vote.  See SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(Philadelphia 1805).
72. In the 1828 edition of Webster’s dictionary, the first meaning of “pass” is “[t]o be en-
acted,” while the second meaning is “to receive the sanction of a legislative house or body by a
majority of votes.”  2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 31 (New York, S. Converse 1828).
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of the term.73
II. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ORDINARY RULES AND
INSULATED RULES
Professor Rubenfeld also claims that it is inconsistent for us to
conclude that the Constitution requires a majority of the House to
have the power to repeal a supermajority rule while denying that the
Constitution requires majority vote to pass legislation.74  Indeed Pro-
fessor Rubenfeld states that we are “vulnerable to a charge of self-
contradiction, or at least to a charge of invoking on [our] own behalf
the very rhetorical moves that [we] would disallow to [our] oppo-
nents.”75  These are strong statements and we are surprised that Pro-
fessor Rubenfeld makes them without even a paragraph of response
to the five pages of arguments on this matter in our original essay.
We believe that the structure, purpose, and history of the Constitu-
tion provide compelling support for a principle that requires a ma-
jority to be able to repeal rules.  There are no similar arguments
available to support a constitutional principle that would preclude
supermajority rules subject to repeal.  Such arguments do not consti-
tute “rhetorical moves” but instead are the traditional stuff of consti-
73. Even if “passed” were understood to mean “passed by majority vote,” it would not
necessarily follow that the Presentment Clause precluded legislative supermajority rules.  The
Clause provides: “Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States.”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added).  Under one reasonable interpretation, this lan-
guage requires that all bills that are presented to the President must have received a majority in
each house, but does not mandate that all bills that receive a majority in each house must be
presented to the President.  This interpretation would allow supermajority rules, because all
bills that would be sent to the President under supermajority rules would have secured at least
a majority in both houses.  This view also finds support from the apparent purpose of the
Clause: It is written as if it were designed to establish and protect the President’s veto powers.
This power is not in any way impaired by legislative supermajority rules.  Indeed, supermajor-
ity rules mean that the President will have to wield his veto authority less often.  This interpre-
tation comports not only with the text of the Clause, but also its placement next to other provi-
sions drafted to make sure that Congress cannot circumvent the President’s veto authority.  See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (assuring that President has authority to veto congressional enact-
ments, however styled).
In contrast to the support for this reading of the Presentment Clause, Professor Ruben-
feld has presented no argument for his view that the Presentment Clause requires all bills that
have received a majority of votes in each house to be presented to the President.  His argu-
ments based on the possibility of rules like the Big-Three Rule are ineffective, because these
rules would be unconstitutional under either interpretation.
74. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 88-89.
75. Id. at 88.
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tutional interpretation.76
Congress’s lack of power to insulate a rule from repeal is rooted
in the most fundamental structural feature of any constitutional sys-
tem—the distinction between constitutional law and rules or legisla-
tion that are not embedded in the Constitution.77  Just as a constitu-
tional system founded on a tripartite system of government does not
contemplate a fourth branch,78 so a system founded on a distinction
between the Constitution and a law enacted under the Constitution
does not contemplate quasi-constitutive law.
Consider first an example of legislation.  If Congress were to en-
act irrepealable legislation that made the penalty for selling drugs life
imprisonment without parole, its action would have in effect trans-
formed an ordinary penalty of criminal law into a provision that was
more deeply embedded than the Constitution, which can be changed
by a two-thirds vote of the Congress and three-quarters of the state
legislatures.79  Similarly, if a single house of Congress were to pass a
rule requiring a supermajority for the enactment of tax legislation
and to make that rule irrepealable, its action would also have the ef-
fect of making that rule less subject to change than the Constitution. 
Once it is clear that an irrepealable rule would violate this basic
structural principle, it is a short step to conclude that rules must be
repealable by a majority.  Even rules that stop short of being abso-
lutely irrepealable, such as rules that may only be repealed by a su-
permajority, must be rejected as a form of quasi-constitutive law.
Such rules cannot be distinguished in a principled manner from con-
stitutional provisions, because the Constitution itself may be
amended by a supermajority of Congress and the state legislatures.80
All rules that cannot be repealed by a majority represent an attempt
by a majority of one house to give its views a permanent status with-
out going through the intricate amendment process required to en-
76. Indeed, on grounds very similar to those set forth in our original essay, two other
scholars have recently defended the constitutionality of the filibuster rule in the Senate while
challenging the constitutionality of the Senate rule that allows a minority to prevent a change in
the filibuster rule.  See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV.
181, 247 (1997) (arguing that entrenchment of the filibuster violates the principle that “[o]ne
legislature cannot bind subsequent legislatures”).
77. For further discussion of this distinction, see McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 9, at
505-06.
78. See, e.g., Ameron v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 787 F.2d 875, 892 (3d Cir.
1985) (Becker, J., concurring in part) (“Even a living constitution cannot grow a new branch.”).
79. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
80. See id.
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trench the views of one generation against those of future genera-
tions.
Majority power over repeals is also a necessary corollary of the
principle of equality between legislatures.  If one legislature were
able to insulate a repeal by any degree of supermajority, it would re-
duce the power of subsequent legislatures beneath the power that the
prior legislature enjoyed.  This fundamental principle was so well
recognized in Blackstone81 and other writings at the time of the
Framing82 that it is an easy step to incorporate it as part of the under-
standing of legislative power and hence the content of Congress’s
authority under the Rules of Proceedings Clause.
In contrast, there is no significant historical or structural support
for the principle that legislation must be passed by ordinary majority
vote.  To the contrary, we have shown that supermajority rules were
well known at the time of the Framing both in the Articles of Con-
federation and in state constitutions.83  Moreover, Luther Cushing,
the leading parliamentarian of the early nineteenth century, noted
that legislatures sometimes passed legislative supermajority rules.84
Finally, legislative supermajority rules are also not open to any struc-
tural objections.  Because such rules can be repealed by a majority,
they cannot be condemned as a form of quasi-constitutive law.
Repealable supermajority rules nevertheless perform a useful
function and cannot be dismissed as merely hortatory, as Professor
Rubenfeld seeks to do.  The repealability of a rule does not in gen-
eral make it ineffective: for instance, the committee system itself is
established by repealable rules but no one doubts its pervasive effects
in shaping legislation.85  Supermajority rules in particular represent a
public precommitment by the majority to a policy—in this case to a
policy disfavoring tax increases.86  Political structures often gain much
of their practical efficacy from their ability to focus public attention
on a particular issue.  While the supermajority rule may always be
81. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *90.
82. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 543 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry B. Dawson
ed., 1891) (suggesting that legislatures at different times possessed “equal authority”).
83. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
84. See CUSHING, supra note 26, at 168.  Cushing argued that legislative supermajority
rules were not in any real sense a departure from majority rule, because such rules were
adopted by a majority vote.  See id.
85. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry A. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of
Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85, 100-02 (1987) (discussing the manner in which
the committee system influences the content and structure of legislation).
86. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 9, at 510.
MCGINN1 06/04/98  1:32 PM
346 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:325
repealed, the public commitment makes it more politically costly to
do so than to simply vote for a tax increase.  Further evidence of the
real world effects of the rule is provided by the lawsuit filed against it:
If the rule were without effect, these Representatives would not be
bitterly opposed to it.
III. MATTERS OF INTERPRETATION
In addition to our specific disagreements with Professor Ruben-
feld, we believe that constitutional issues of methodology may divide
us.  We cannot be sure of this, because he is not explicit about his
mode of constitutional interpretation.87  As far as we can tell, his
method appears to be basically originalist or textualist in at least this
limited sense: He eschews arguments based on policies or values,
evolving or otherwise.88  But he appears to practice a textualism or
originalism of linguistic isolation.  His analysis centers almost entirely
on the word “pass” in the Presentment Clause and his manner of di-
vining its meaning is to spin out a variety of imaginative hypotheti-
cals.
We believe that his method of interpretation is misguided.  The
proper method of interpreting the Constitution begins with a consid-
eration of the text.  Where it is ambiguous, as Professor Rubenfeld
suggests it is here, it is necessary to systematically canvass the argu-
ments based on structure, purpose and history relevant to the dis-
87. In particular, Professor Rubenfeld does not appear to rely on the distinctive method of
construction advanced in his recent article on constitutional interpretation.  See Jed Rubenfeld,
Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119, 1122 (1995) (advancing an interpre-
tive method that he describes as “neither originalist, literalist, processualist, nor fundamental-
ist”).  Professor Rubenfeld argues that constitutional provisions should be interpreted to cover
the “paradigm cases” the Framers had in mind while drafting them.  See id. at 1169.  He also
claims, however, that interpretation must be supplemented by the implications of the commit-
ments the provisions embody as these commitments unfold through American history—a proc-
ess that Professor Rubenfeld labels “commitmentarian.”  See id. at 1172.  The arguments that
Professor Rubenfeld makes against the three-fifths rule do not appear to rest on a commitmen-
tarian process unfolding though history, for they would apply as well in 1787 as they would to-
day.
88. Professor Rubenfeld, however, wrongly suggests that we relied on policy arguments to
support our view that the three-fifths rule is constitutional.  See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 75.
Although we did indicate that the three-fifths rule was good policy, we made clear that our
policy views were entirely distinct from our defense of the rule’s constitutionality.  See McGin-
nis & Rappaport, supra note 9, at 508 (“We believe that the three-fifths rule not only passes
muster as a matter of positive constitutional law but also advances important policy goals, in-
cluding the cause of democratic self-governance.”).
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puted constitutional issue.89 
Arguments from structure are essential if we are to read a con-
stitution as we should—holistically.90  A constitution is not designed
to provide a laundry list of unrelated provisions, but to establish an
integrated system.91  Thus, whenever a provision is ambiguous, we
properly read it in light of the rest of the document.92  Sometimes
other specific provisions shed light on a dispute over the meaning of a
particular clause.  For instance, our view that the House Composition
Clause permits only Members to vote is bolstered by other clauses
such as the Incompatibility Clause, which presuppose that voting is
limited to Members.93  Sometimes inferences from the document as a
whole, rather than from specific provisions, are relevant.  For in-
stance, we suggest that the distinction between constitutional law and
ordinary legislation that pervades the entire Constitution provides
strong reasons for concluding that the Constitution permits super-
majority rules that can be repealed by a majority but prohibits su-
permajority rules that are insulated from such repeals.94
Arguments from purpose are also essential to resolving ambigui-
ties if we are to read the Constitution to advance its core function—
the establishment of a system of political governance.95  Given the
requisites necessary to a functioning legislature, it is natural to read
the House Composition Clause to guarantee voting and other rights
to members of the legislature.96  Because a legislature requires voting
rights on procedure as well as substance, no interpretation of the Pre-
89. Structure, purpose, and history are the traditional methods for resolving questions that
are not answered by the text.  See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59-62; see also
Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.  1484,
1486-87 (1987) (offering this tripartite approach to constitutional interpretation).
90. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Ex-
ecutive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1155, 1216 (1987) (defending structural interpre-
tation in light of need to construe the Constitution holistically).
91. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Unitary Executive Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 313,
325 (1993) (postulating that structural arguments help correct “tunnel vision” that results from
focusing on a single provision).
92. The preeminent case exemplifying such an approach is, of course, McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819) (noting that an interpretation of the enumerated
powers depends “on a fair construction of the whole instrument”).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
94. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
95. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to Professor
Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347, 351 (1994) (arguing that the Constitution must be interpreted in
light of its overriding purpose of establishing a system of constitutional governance).
96. Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986) (evaluating a separation of powers is-
sue based on the Framers’ purpose in dividing federal power between the three branches).
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sentment Clause can sustain these requisites.  Professor Rubenfeld
thus lacks a persuasive rationale for reading a majority requirement
into the Clause.97
History also helps resolve ambiguities because the Constitution
established its system of political governance against the backdrop of
the English constitution—itself a distillation of established practices
rather than a written document.98  In our construction of the House
Composition Clause, we looked to practices of the English Parlia-
ment to help understand what were the necessary rights of legisla-
tors.99  Moreover, the discovery of the equality of parliaments as a
background structural principle to the American Constitution pro-
vides an additional reason to conclude that Congress may not insu-
late its rules from repeal.100  The Constitution was also written against
the background of the Articles of Confederation.  The Articles dem-
onstrate that majority rule was not presumed in national legislative
assemblies in America but rather was expressly established where in-
tended.  The presence of majoritarian requirements in the Articles is
an important argument against reading such requirements into the
Constitution in the absence of a textual provision.
Of course, arguments based on structure, purpose, and history
depend on judgment.  Some of these arguments are stronger than
others and sometimes difficult questions arise as to whether such ar-
guments are strong enough to affect the meaning of a less than pellu-
cid constitutional provision.101  But it is hardly surprising that disci-
plined judgment is necessary to interpretation, as that is the art that
constitutes judging.
97. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1745 (1996).  The Loving Court
noted that “[t]he historical necessities and events of the English constitutional experience . . .
were familiar to [the Framers] and inform our understanding of the purpose and meaning of
constitutional provisions.”  Id. at 1747-48.  See generally James Q. Whitman, Why Did the
Revolutionary Lawyers Confuse Custom and Reason?, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (1991)
(arguing that “understanding the jurisprudence of the American revolutionary requires . . . a
wide acquaintance with a great deal of western legal history”).
99. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
101. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1228 (1987) (discussing the necessity of assigning a relative
weight to each category of constitutional argument).  Although we do not accept Professor
Fallon’s view that a wide range of considerations, including contemporary policy concerns, are
legitimate factors in constitutional interpretation, we do agree that one of the main tasks for
constitutional interpretation is the construction of a coherent balance among the factors that
are legitimate.
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What is striking to us is that Professor Rubenfeld spends little of
his essay disputing the judgments that we reached about supermajor-
ity rules.  Instead, he refers pejoratively to our analysis as resting on
“emanations” and “penumbras”102—pejoratives that might be applied
to his own argument that the word “pass” emanates a principle of
“passed by majority vote.”  But, as we have shown, our interpretation
is actually based on structure, purpose and history.  Indeed, the
power of such traditional constitutional methodology becomes ap-
parent, because he cannot avoid it.  While he casts his principal ar-
gument in terms of hypotheticals, its essence—that the Framers
would have rejected a system that permitted Members to be deprived
of their votes—is nothing but an argument based on purpose and in-
tent, albeit one based largely on assertions.  The flaw of Professor
Rubenfeld’s essay ultimately may be not that he employs an indefen-
sible methodology, but that he is not sufficiently self-conscious about
its application to practice it comprehensively.  Only by a comprehen-
sive investigation of the structure, purpose, and history of the Consti-
tution can we reach measured judgments about subtle and difficult
constitutional issues.
CONCLUSION
The three-fifths rule is constitutional.  Under the Rules of Pro-
ceedings Clause, the House of Representatives has the authority to
pass any rule relating to its operations unless it violates some lan-
guage or principle in the Constitution.  Despite Professor Ruben-
feld’s arguments, the Presentment Clause does not supply such lan-
guage, because there is no evidence that “passed” means “passed by
majority vote.”  Nor is there any need to interpolate a majority re-
quirement in the Clause in order to prevent rules that would permit
outrageous results, such as voting by non-members.  Other constitu-
tional provisions comfortably provide the principles that assure that
the legislature can fulfill its core function of democratic deliberation.
102. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 85.
